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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Section 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Petitioner intends to assert the following issues on appeal: 
1. Whether the Appeals Board exceeded its authority by 
considering arguments that were not previously raised in the case. 
Standard of review: This issue constitutes a question of law, 
and is subject to the correction of error standard of review. Savage 
Industries. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991). 
This issue was preserved in the record at (R. 941,943,945). 
2. Whether the Appeals Board failed to apply the appropriate legal 
standard in determining Petitioner's retaliation claim. 
Standard of review: This issue constitutes a question of law, 
and is subject to the correction of error standard of review. Savage 
Industries. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991). 
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This issue was preserved in the record at (R. 940-941, 943-944,945). 
3. Whether the Appeals Board committed legal error by failing to 
consider the credibility determinations of the Administrative Law Judge. 
Standard of review: This issue constitutes a question of law, 
and is subject to the correction of error standard of review. Savage 
Industries. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991). 
This issue was preserved in the record at (R. 946). 
4. Whether the evidence in the case supports the decision of the 
Appeals Board. 
Standard of Review: This issue constitutes a question of fact 
and is subject to the substantial evidence standard of review. Utah Code 
Section 63-46b-l 6(g). 
This issue was preserved in the record at (R. 943-946). 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Section 34A-l-303(4)(c) may be determinative or of 
central importance to Issue 1 set form above. Section 34A-l-303(4)(c) 
states: 
The commissioner or Appeals Board may base its decision on: 
(i) the evidence previously submitted in the case; or 
(ii) on written argument or written supplemental evidence 
requested by the commissioner or the Appeals Board. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner Susan Carter ("Carter") filed a Charge of Discrimination 
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination and Labor Division ("UALD") on August 
11,1998, alleging that she had been terminated from her employment by 
Sullivan-Schein Dental Co. ("Sullivan") in retaliation for making a 
complaint of gender discrimination, in violation of Utah Code Section 34A-
5-106(1). 
After conducting an investigation, the UALD issued a Determination 
finding reasonable cause to believe that Sullivan had violated 34A-5-106(1) 
in relation to Carter's termination. 
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Sullivan appealed said Determination, and the case was assigned to 
the Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. After the parties 
conducted substantial discovery, Sullivan filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment that was denied by Administrative Law Judge Richard M. La 
Jeunesse ("ALJ La Jeunesse"). 
A four-day evidentiary hearing was held before ALJ La Jeunesse, 
after which he issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, 
dated January 7,2004. In summary, ALJ La Jeunesse found that Sullivan 
had violated Section 34A-5-106(1) in relation to Carter's termination. 
Sullivan filed a Motion for Review with the Appeals Board of the 
Utah Labor Commission ("the Appeals Board") on March 8,2004. Carter 
submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to said Motion for Review. No 
hearing was held in relation to said Motion for Review, and no additional 
evidence or argument was requested by the Appeals Board. 
On May 31,2005, the Appeals Board issued an Order Granting 
Motion for Review. In summary, said Order reversed the decision of ALJ 
La Jeunesse, and held that Respondent had not violated Section 34A-5-
- 7 -
106(1) in regard to Carter's termination. Said Order was based upon a 2-1 
split decision of the Appeals Board, with two members voting in support of 
the Order. A separate opinion written by the dissenting member of the 
Appeals Board stated, in part: "The Majority's opinion is wrong on both the 
facts and the law." (R. 936). 
Carter subsequently filed a Motion to Reconsider Order on Motion for 
Review, which was denied by the same 2-1 majority of the Appeals Board. 
(R. 970-972). 
Carter timely filed her Petitioner for Review with the Utah Court of 
Appeals on September 13,2005. (R. 974-975). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. From approximately November 1992 to August of 1993, Carter 
was employed with Mt. West Dental as a sales representative for dental 
supplies. (See Carter's Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 71-72, 
79,173). During such employment, Carter believed she was discriminated 
against on the basis of her gender by her supervisors, Parke Simmons 
("Simmons") and Blaine Brown ("Brown"). (See Carter Testimony, March 
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26,2003 Transcript, pp. 71-80). 
2. Subsequent to her termination from Mt. West Dental, Carter 
became employed with Henry Schein Inc., as a sales representative for 
dental supplies. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 80-
81). 
3. Prior to August of 1997, Simmons and Brown became 
employed with Sullivan Dental Products, Inc., as equipment sales specialists. 
(See Simmons' Testimony, March 27,2003 Transcript, pp. 190-191). 
4. Commencing August of 1997, a merger occurred between 
Henry Schein, Inc. and Sullivan Dental Products, Inc. The merged entity 
became Sullivan-Schein Dental Co. ("Sullivan"). (See Carter Testimony, 
March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 81-82). 
5. Carter was assigned to the Sullivan sales force in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, as were Simmons and Brown. (See Carter Testimony, March 26, 
2003 Transcript, pp. 81-84). 
6. Because of her concerns regarding potential discrimination 
from Simmons and Brown, Carter delivered a letter to Sullivan management 
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on December 14,1997, alleging she had been subjected to gender 
discrimination during her prior employment by Simmons and Brown, and 
requesting that she not be assigned to the same office as Simmons and 
Brown. Carter further requested that her letter be treated as confidential. 
{See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 84-88 and Exh. P-2). 
7. Carter's letter was handled by Sullivan's Vice President and 
Special Council, Leonard David ("David"). At Mr. David's direction, 
Simmons and Brown were informed of Carter's complaint and instructed not 
to retaliate against Carter. During the course of Mr. David's handling of the 
letter, the substance of Carter's complaint was disclosed to Simmons, 
Brown, and at least eight Sullivan Managers, including Carter's second-level 
Manager, James Engel ("Engel"), and Carter's third-level Manager, James 
Stanly ("Stahly"). (R. 774). 
8. On December 29,1997, Mr. David sent a letter to Carter, 
stating that her complaint had been investigated and that appropriate action 
had been taken. However, Carter's request mat she not be assigned to the 
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same office as Simmons and Brown was not addressed. (See Carter 
Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 89-90 and Exh. P-3). 
9. Prior to the merger, the sales representatives of Henry Shein, 
Inc. and Sullivan Dental Products, Inc. competed for customers, and had 
overlapping sales territories. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 
Transcript, pp. 93-94). Commencing the first week of January 1998, the two 
sales forces integrated. However, substantial confusion and conflict existed 
in regard to the sales territories at least until the time of Carter's termination 
on March 25,1998. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 
97-98,102-103; See Butler Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 229-
238). 
10. During approximately December of 1997, Joe Scheutzow 
("Scheutzow") was assigned as Manager for the Region that included the 
Salt Lake City sales representatives. As such, he became the direct 
supervisor of Carter, Simmons, Brown, and several other sales 
representatives operating out of Salt Lake City, Utah. (See Carter 
Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 94-95). 
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11. James Engel ("Engel") was the Northwest Zone Manager for 
Sullivan, and was Carter's second-level Manager. (R. 774). 
12. Shortly after Scheutzow was assigned as Carter's supervisor, 
Carter informed him of her complaint regarding Simmons and Brown. (See 
Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 94-97). Approximately 
one month later, Scheutzow told Carter that he had previously known about 
her complaint. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 116-
118). 
13. At Trial and in his Deposition, Scheutzow denied that he had 
any knowledge of Carter's complaint prior to her termination. (See 
Scheutzow Testimony, March 27,2003 Transcript, pp. 142-143). 
However, Scheutzow's knowledge of Carter's complaint was established by 
Simmons, who testified that Scheutzow told him he knew of the complaint 
and that "everybody better be careful." (See Simmons' Testimony, March 
27,2003 Transcript, pp.204-205; R.774-775). 
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14. Scheutzow's office was located in Seattle, Washington, and he 
only occasionally visited the Salt Lake City Office. During his absence, 
Simmons and Brown exercised informal supervisory authority over the Salt 
Lake City sales representatives and presided over the monthly sales 
meetings. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 118-119; 
R. 775). 
15. In addressing the overlapping sales territories among the sales 
representatives, Scheutzow initially instructed the sales representatives to 
continue calling upon the same customers they had called on prior to the 
merger. This resulted in numerous instances in which multiple sales 
representatives were calling upon the same account. This situation was 
referred to as a "crossover."1 Numerous crossovers occurred after the 
merger, resulting in substantial confusion among the sales representatives 
1
 Sullivan's Director of Human Resources, Gary Anderson ("Anderson"), 
testified regarding a distinction between "crossovers," where two sales 
representatives are assigned to a single account, and "poaching," where one 
sales representative calls upon an account that has been assigned to another 
sales representative. However, none of the sales representatives who 
testified (Carter, Butler, Simmons or Bingham) made such a distinction. 
Likewise, the sales representatives' Managers (Scheutzow, Engel) did not 
note such a distinction. For the most part, references to "crossovers" by the 
witnesses include the concept of "poaching." See Scheutzow Testimony, 
March 27,2003 Transcript, pp. 145-152; See Simmons Testimony, March 
27,2003 Transcript, 207). 
- 13 -
and their customers. Further, competition existed among the sales 
representatives with respect to specific customers. {See Carter Testimony, 
March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 102-103,107,111-116,168-169; See Butler 
Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 225-228; See Engel Testimony, 
March 28,2003 Transcript, pp. 103-105,115; R. 776-777;). 
16. Scheutzow and Engel received numerous complaints from the 
sales representatives relating to crossover issues. In general, the sales 
representatives were instructed to be patient while the customers were being 
assigned. {See Butler Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 241-242). 
17. Scheutzow testified that several of the sales representatives had 
crossover issues that he considered severe. However, none of the sales 
representatives received discipline for crossover issues except Carter. 
{See Scheutzow Testimony, March 27,2003 Transcript, pp. 145-146; R. 
777). 
18. Scheutzow and Engel gradually assigned customers to specific 
sales representatives. Each sales representative was provided a "run list," 
which set forth the accounts that were assigned to that sales representative. 
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Once a customer was assigned to a specific sales representative, the other 
sales representatives were expected to refrain from calling upon that 
customer. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 103-106, 
168-169 and Exh.P-7). 
19. Prior to the merger, Carter and former Sullivan Dental Products 
sales representative Melanie Bingham ("Bingham") both called upon the 
account of Dr. James Clegg. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 
Transcript, pp. 121-122). 
20. During approximately February 1998, the Clegg account was 
assigned to Bingham. (Id). 
21. Shortly after the assignment of the Clegg account to Bingham, 
Carter met one of Dr. Clegg's employees at a dental convention. Dr. 
Clegg's employee asked Carter a question about Dr. Clegg's bill. Carter 
answered the question, and directed the employee to have Bingham address 
the issue. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 122-124). 
22. Also shortly after the Clegg account was assigned to Bingham, 
Carter was approached by Dr. Clegg while she was visiting another dentist 
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in the same building. Dr. Clegg asked a similar question about his billing, 
and Carter referred him to Bingham. (See Carter Testimony, March 26, 
2003 Transcript, pp. 124-125). 
23. Bingham learned about the contact between Carter and Dr. 
Clegg's office, and complained to Brown, who referred her to Scheutzow. 
(R. 778). 
24. On February 18,1998, Engel sent a letter to Carter, 
reprimanding her for calling on the Clegg account. Said letter falsely 
accused Carter of offering better discounts than Bingham could offer. Said 
letter threatened Carter with disciplinary action, including termination of 
employment, in the event of any "further infractions." (See Carter 
Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 125-129 and Exh. P-8). 
25. Engel did not discuss the issue regarding the Clegg account 
with Carter prior to sending said letter. (See Carter Testimony, March 26, 
2003 Transcript, p. 127; See Engel Testimony, March 28,2003 Transcript, 
pp. 179-181; R. 779). 
26. Engel considered the letter to constitute a disciplinary action 
against Carter. (R. 779). 
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27. At the time of Engel's letter, Sullivan had in effect a Handbook 
and Disciplinary Procedure requiring that all disciplinary actions be 
reviewed by Human Resources, and that the employee have an opportunity 
to respond to the disciplinary action. (See Carter Testimony, March 26, 
2003 Transcript, pp. 98-102 and Exhs. P-4 and P-5). 
28. Human Resources was not contacted in regard to Engel's 
disciplinary action against Carter. (See Engel Testimony, March 28,2003 
Transcript, pp. 192). 
29. The testimony of Sullivan's witnesses about how Engel's letter 
to Carter came about was substantially conflicting. ALJ La Jeunesse 
described such testimony as " almost surrealistic." (R. 781). Scheutzow 
denied having any involvement at all in the letter. Engel stated that he wrote 
the letter at Scheutzow's request. Bingham testified that she initially 
complained to Brown, who suggested she discuss the matter with 
Scheutzow, and that Schetzow then directed her to write a letter to Engel 
concerning the issue. Engel denied ever seeing such a letter. (R. 781). 
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30. Carter called Engel, explained what had occurred with the 
Clegg account, and complained about Engel's letter. Engel admitted that the 
letter was "harsh." (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, p. 
128; See Engel Testimony, March 28,2003 Transcript, p. 141; R. 781). 
31. After receiving Engel' s letter, Carter contacted Bingham and 
explained what had occurred with the Clegg account. Bingham apologized 
to Carter, and there were no problems between Carter and Bingham 
thereafter. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 129-131). 
32. Bingham also told Carter that Brown had informed her about 
Carter's letter. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 121, 
129-130). 
33. Carter subsequently called Sullivan's Director of Human 
Resources, Gary Anderson ("Anderson") and complained about Engel's 
letter. Anderson told Carter that Engel had confirmed the problem with Dr. 
Clegg's office. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 131-
133). However, after Carter's termination, Dr. Clegg informed Carter that 
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Engel had not contacted his office. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 
Transcript, pp. 131-133 and Exh. P-34). 
34. Prior to Carter's termination on March 25,1998, the Heritage 
Dental account was included on Carter's run list. (See Carter Testimony, 
March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 190-194). 
35. Heritage Dental was a dental laboratory. The owner of 
Heritage Dental, Mark Mason ("Mason"), did not order his dental supplies 
through a sales representative, as he preferred to order them over the 
telephone. (R. 781). 
36. Individual dentists who worked within Heritage Dental had 
separate accounts with Sullivan. One of such dentists, John Willardsen, was 
also on Carter's run list. (See Butler Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, 
pp. 194-196). 
37. Approximately 3-4 weeks prior to Carter's termination, 
Heritage Dental's office manager, Beverly Myers ("Myers") allegedly called 
Butler, complained about Carter, and asked Butler to take over as Heritage 
Dental's sales representative. (R. 782).2 
Myers denies mat she ever asked Butler to replace Carter as Heritage 
Dental's sales representative. (R.783). Further, it is undisputed that Mason 
preferred to order his dental supplies via telephone. 
3 8. Butler informed Scheutzow of the alleged call from Myers, and 
Scheutzow instructed Butler to take over as Heritage Dental's sales 
representative. However, Scheutzow never told Carter that she had been 
replaced as Heritage Dental's sales representative. Carter continued to call 
upon Heritage Dental and the individual dentists who worked within 
Heritage Dental. {See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 
135-136; R. 782-783). 
39. On or about March 25,1998, Myers allegedly called Butler 
again and told him that Carter had been into Heritage Dental, and that 
Mason was going to call the police if she ever came in again. (R. 782). 
40. Butler reported Myers' alleged complaint to Scheutzow. 
Scheutzow testified that he called Myers and confirmed the complaint. 
Myers confirms that she received a call from Scheutzow regarding Carter, 
but denies making any complaint about Carter. (R. 783). 
41. Scheutzow reported the alleged Myers complaint to Engel, who 
in turn reported it to Stahly. The decision was made to terminate Carter's 
employment, due to her contact with Heritage Dental. (R. 782). 
Myers denies that she ever made such a call, or that Mason even had the 
authority to prevent Carter from servicing the individual dentists within 
Heritage Dental. (R. 783). 
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42. Carter was not given any opportunity to respond to the 
allegations regarding Heritage Dental prior to her termination. (R. 782) 
43. Sullivan Human Resources was not contacted in connection 
with Carter's termination. (See Scheutzow Testimony, March 27,2003 
Transcript, pp. 175-176; See Engel Testimony, March 28 Transcript, pp. 
191-192,197). 
44. On March 25,1998, Scheutzow called Carter into a meeting in 
Simmon's office and stated, "I need to terminate your employment effective 
immediately." Carter asked why, and Scheutzow stated, "You did it again. 
You went into an account that was not assigned to you." Carter asked which 
account, and Scheutzow stated, "Heritage Dental." Carter lold Scheutzow 
that Heritage Dental was her account, and offered to show it to him on her 
run list. Scheutzow repeated, "I need to terminate your employment, 
effective immediately." Carter then stated, "This isn't about crossing over in 
a territory, this is about that letter I wrote, isn't it?" Scheutzow responded, 
"I can't say." (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 133-
134; R. 782-783). 
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45. Scheutzow prepared an "exit interview form," that set form the 
grounds of termination as "violation of Memo/Directive Dated 
2/18/98.. ..Verified with Bev at Heritage...That Susan Carter called on 
office." (R. 783 and Exh. P-25). 
46. On or about August 21,1998, Scheutzow added language to the 
exit interview form, explaining his "I can't say" statement as follows: "Re 
SC statement. J.S. said 'I can't say' should be—'I can't speak to that' (due 
to not knowing what was in the letter.)" (See Exh. P-26). 
47. It is undisputed that Carter was never told she was not assigned 
to the Heritage Dental account. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 
Transcript, pp. 133-134; R. 782-783). In short, Carter was terminated for 
calling on her own account. 
48. Carter contacted Anderson and complained about her 
termination. Anderson subsequently contacted Carter and stated. "Yeah, 
you don't work there any more and there's nothing I can do about it." (See 
Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 137-138; R. 782-783). 
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49. Carter contacted Stahly and complained about her termination. 
Stahly stated that he had contacted Heritage Dental and confirmed the 
complaint regarding Carter. {See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 
Transcript, p. 139). 
50. Carter filed a Charge of Discrimination with the UALD on 
August 11,1998, alleging that she had been unlawfully terminated in 
retaliation for making a complaint of gender discrimination. (R. I). 
51. After conducting an investigation, the UALD i ssued a 
Determination finding reasonable cause to believe that Sullivan violated 
Section 34A-5-106(l) in terminating Carter. (R. 16-19). 
52. Sullivan appealed said Determination, and the case was 
assigned to the Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. After 
the parties conducted substantial discovery, Sullivan filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment that was denied by the ALJ La Jeunesse, pursuant to an 
Order dated November 27,2002. (R. 519=530). 
53. A four-day evidentiary hearing was held before ALJ La 
Jeunesse, after which he issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
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Order, dated January 7,2004. (R. 769-793). In essence, ALJ La Jeunesse 
found that Sullivan had Section 34A-5-106(l) in terminating Carter's 
employment. ALJ La Jeunesse's decision included several determinations 
regarding the credibility of various witnesses. The ALJ found, inter alia: 
As with the Clegg account, the preponderance of the evidence in this 
case demonstrated an animus against Ms. Carter on the part of 
Sullivan-Schein independent of valid concerns over her dealings with 
Heritage. Further, as with the Clegg account, Ms. Carter's superiors 
at Sullivan-Schein appeared eager for an opportunity to discipline her 
without any concern for the factual accuracy of the allegations of 
wrongdoing leveled against her. Indeed, despite numerous apparently 
valid crossover issues involving at one time or other all of the Utah 
sales representatives, Sullivan-Schein only disciplined and terminated 
Ms. Carter over factually specious allegations. (R 784). 
54. Sullivan filed a Motion for Review with the Appeals Board of 
the Utah Labor Commission ("the Appeals Board") on March 8,2004. (R. 
837-892). Carter submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to said Motion 
for Review. (R. 897-925). No hearing was held in relation to said Motion for 
Review, and no additional evidence or argument was requested from the 
parties. 
55. On May 31,2005, the Appeals Board issued an Order Granting 
Motion for Review. (R. 930-937). In essence, said Order reversed the 
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decision of ALJ La Jeunesse, and held mat Respondent had not violated 
Section 34A-5-106(1) in terminating Carter. Said Order was based upon a 
2-1 split decision of the Appeals Board, with two members voting in support 
of the Order. A separate opinion written by the dissenting member of the 
Appeals Board stated, in part: "The Majority's opinion is wrong on both the 
facts and the law." (R. 936-937). In reversing the ALJ's decision, the 
Majority of the Appeals Board did not address any of the credibility 
determinations that he made. 
56. On June 20,2005, Carter filed a Motion to Reconsider Order on 
Motion for Review. (R. 939-947). Said Motion was denied by the same 2-1 
Majority of the Appeals Board, in an Order dated August 25,2005. (R. 970-
972). 
57. Carter timely filed and served her Petition for Review with the 
Utah Court of Appeals on September 13,2005. (R. 974). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Majority of the Appeals Board exceeded its authority by 
basing its decision upon arguments that were not previously raised in the 
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case. Utah Code Section 34A-1 -303(4)(c) sets forth the grounds upon 
which the Appeals Board may base its decision, and does not permit the 
Appeals Board to raise arguments that were not previously raised in the case. 
In addition to exceeding its statutory authority, the action of the Appeals 
Board was grossly unfair to Carter, who had no opportunity to respond to the 
new arguments that were raised by the Appeals Board. 
2. The Majority of the Appeals Board failed to apply the 
appropriate legal standards in determining Carter's retaliation claim. In 
addition to the established elements of a prima facie case, the Majority 
imposed requirements upon Carter that are not recognized under Utah or 
Federal law. Specifically, the Majority found that an employer's "prompt 
and appropriate action" in response to a complaint of discrimination negates 
a finding of subsequent retaliation. Further, the Majority found that, when a 
discrimination complaint involves events from several years before and at a 
different employer, that fact negates a finding of retaliation. The Majority 
cited no authority recognizing these requirements in a retaliation case. 
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3. The Majority of the Appeals Board committed legal error by 
failing to address the credibility determinations that were made by the ALJ. 
Under controlling Utah case law, where the decision of a hearing officer is 
based to a large extent upon credibility determinations, a reviewing official 
is required to adequately detail his or her reasons for reaching a different 
result. In the present case, the Majority did not even acknowledge the 
existence of credibility issues, much less state any reason for rejecting the 
ALJ's credibility findings. 
4. The evidence cited by the Majority of the Appeals Board is 
insufficient to support its decision in the case. The Majority relied upon 
certain facts (i.e., Sullivan's prompt action in response to Carter's letter and 
that fact that Carter's complaint involved events occurring several years 
prior at a different employer), to negate an inference of retaliatory causation, 
when, in actuality, such facts are completely immaterial to that issue. The 
Majority also relied upon the alleged fact that the sales representatives who 
complained about Carter did not know about Carter's complaint. However, 
that fact is immaterial to the issue in the case, which is whether Sullivan 
Management treated Carter adversely because of her complaint. 
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The Majority also cited a complaint that was made against Carter by 
Butler. However, the uncontested facts in the case show that such complaint 
had no relation to Carter's termination. 
The Majority substantially misconstrued the procedure that existed at 
Sullivan in regard to assigning customer accounts during the time period in 
which Carter was employed. 
Finally, the Majority created excuses for Sullivan's failure to 
communicate with Carter or follow its Discipline Policy. In summary, the 
Majority's decision is based entirely upon facts that are immaterial, 
erroneous, and/or unsupported by the record. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE. 
All of the evidence relied upon by the Appeals Board in support of its 
decision is set forth within its Order Granting Motion for Review. (R. 930-
935). Such evidence includes the following: 
(a). The Majority found that Sullivan took "prompt and appropriate 
action" in response to Carter's letter, thereby indicating that her letter was 
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not a motivating factor for her termination. (R. 934). This argument had not 
previously been raised in the case. The Majority cited no authority and 
provided no reasoning in support of such conclusion. 
(b). The Majority found that Carter's letter complaining of gender 
discrimination dealt with events several years past and at a different 
employer, thereby indicating that her letter was not a motivating factor for 
her termination. (R. 934). The Majority cited no authority and provided no 
reasoning in support of such conclusion. 
(c). The Majority found that the sales representatives who 
complained about Carter did not know about Carter's letter. (R. 934). In 
fact, there was evidence that Bingham did know about the letter. (See Carter 
Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 129-131). More importantly, 
this finding is immaterial to the relevant issue in the case, which is whether 
Sullivan Management treated Carter adversely because of her complaint. 
(d). The Majority found that Butler made a complaint about Carter 
regarding the account of Dr. Brooks. (R. 932,934). However, Carter never 
received any discipline for calling on his account, and Sullivan has never 
asserted that Carter's calling on Dr. Brooks was a reason for her termination. 
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{See Butler Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 241-245; See 
Scheutzow Testimony, June 10,2003 Transcript, pp. 67-68). 
(e). With respect to Sullivan's failure to discuss the crossover 
complaints with Carter, or to involve Human Resources in her disciplinary 
action and termination, the Majority found: 
Sullivan-Schein's failure to investigate the details of the 
complaints against Ms. Carter is most reasonably attributable 
to 1) wide-ranging responsibilities of Sullivan-Schein 
managers; 2) disorganization and confusion engendered by the 
merger, 3) the company's paramount concern for the continuity 
of its newly combined sales force; and 4) the repetitive nature 
of the complaints about Ms. Carter's conduct." (R. 935). 
(emphasis added). 
None of these arguments had previously been raised in the case, and 
there is no evidence in the record to support them. 
(f). The Majority made the following finding with respect to the 
procedure that Sullivan used in assigning accounts to sales representatives: 
To minimize the crossover problem, Sullivan-Schein began a 
process of identifying each sales representative's accounts. In 
cases where only one representative had been servicing an 
account, that representative retained the account. If more than 
one representative had been servicing an account, the account 
was assigned to the representative with the highest sales to the 
account. But if a customer expressed a preference for a 
particular sales representative, the account was assigned to that 
sales representative. In conjunction with this process of 
-30-
identifying accounts, two rules were emphasized by Sullivan-
Schein management and by the sales representatives 
themselves. First, no sales representative should have dealings 
with customers assigned to another sales representative. 
Second, no sales representative should solicit a customer to 
express a preference for that representative. This last rule was 
referred to as "soliciting loyalty." (R. 931-932). 
The Majority cited no evidentiary basis for this description of 
Sullivan's procedure, and this description is substantially inaccurate. For 
example, there is no evidentiary basis for the Majority's statement that, "no 
sales representatives should have dealings with customers assigned to 
another sales representative." The Majority also overlooks undisputed 
evidence regarding ambiguities and "grey areas" within Sullivan's procedure 
that were noted by the ALJ. (R. 777). 
Most importantly, the Majority disregarded undisputed evidence that 
Sullivan's initial procedure in relation to account assignments was to 
have the sales representatives continue calling on the same accounts that 
they had called upon prior to the merger. (See preceding Paras. 15-
17). It was this procedure that led to the crossover problems, and this 
procedure remained substantially in effect up until the time of Carter's 
termination 
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The following Sections of this Argument expound upon the above-
stated defects within the findings and conclusions of the Appeals Board. 
II. THE APPEALS BOARD EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN 
CONSIDERING ARGUMENTS THAT WERE NOT 
PREVIOUSLY RAISED IN THE CASE. 
In reaching its decision, the Majority of the Appeals Board 
substantially relied upon two arguments that had not previously been raised 
in the case: 
(1) that Sullivan's "prompt and appropriate action" in response to 
Carter's letter negated a finding of subsequent retaliation, and 
(2) that Sullivan's failure to investigate the details of the complaints 
against Carter was "most reasonably attributable to:" (1) wide-ranging 
responsibilities of Sullivan-Schein managers; 2) disorganization and 
confusion engendered by the merger; 3) the company's paramount concern 
for the continuity of its newly combined sales force; and 4) the repetitive 
nature of the complaints about Ms. Carter's conduct." (R. 935). 
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Utah Code Section 34A-l-303(4)(c) states: 
The commissioner or the Appeals Board may base its 
decision on: 
(i) the evidence previously submitted in the case; or 
(ii) on written argument or written supplemental 
evidence requested by the commissioner or Appeals 
Board. 
By its express terms, Section 34A-l-303(4)(c) limits the factors upon 
which the Appeals Board may base its decision. These factors do not 
include new arguments that are raised for the first time by the Appeals Board 
upon review. To the contrary, Section 34A-l-303(4Xc) limits the Appeals 
Board decision to "written argument...requested by the Appeals Board." 
Although the distinction between "evidence" and "argument" is not 
always clear, such a distinction exists within the express terms of Section 
34A-l-303(4)(c). The assertion of the Appeals Board that Sullivan's alleged 
prompt and appropriate response to Carter's letter negates an inference of 
retaliation constitutes an argument, i.e., it is not simply a finding of fact, but 
an argument that a legal conclusion is warranted by certain facts. 
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The Appeals Board's finding that Sullivan's failure to investigate the 
details of the complaints against Ms. Carter is "most reasonably attributable 
to" certain factors also constitutes an argument, i.e., a legal conclusion 
derived from certain alleged facts. 
The Appeals Board's use of arguments that were not previously raised 
in the case exceeds its authority, and substantially undermines the validity 
of its decision. Further, the Appeals Board's use of such arguments is 
grossly unfair to Carter, who had no opportunity to respond to such 
arguments prior to the Appeals Board's decision. 
Since the Appeals Board exceeded its authority in making a decision 
based upon arguments that had not previously been raised in the case, the 
decision of the Appeals Board should be reversed and the decision of the 
ALJ should be adopted. Giles v. Industrial Com'n. 692 P.2d 743 (Utah 
1984). In the alternative, the case should be remanded to the Appeals Board 
for an amended decision that does not rely upon arguments that were not 
previously raised in the case. Vali Convalescent and Care Inst v. Div. Of 
Health Care Financing. 797 P.2d 438 (Utah 1990). 
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III. THE APPEALS BOARD FAILED TO APPLY THE PROPER 
LEGAL STANDARD IN DETERMINING CARTER'S 
RETALIATION CLAIM. 
The Majority of the Appeals Board failed to apply the proper legal 
standard in determining Carter's retaliation claim. Specifically, the Majority 
imposed additional requirements upon Carter that are not recognized under 
Utah or Federal law. 
The Majority correctly set forth the elements of a prima facie case of 
retaliation under Utah Code Section 34A-5-106 as follows: 1) protected 
opposition to discrimination; 2) adverse action by the employer subsequent 
to the protected activity; and 3) a causal connection between the employee's 
activity and the adverse action. (R. 933-934) (quoting Viktron/Lika v. Labor 
Commission. 38 P.3d 993,995 (Utah App. 2001). Notably absent from these 
elements is any requirement that the employer fail to take prompt or 
appropriate action in response to the underlying complaint of discrimination. 
The Appeals Board held that Carter met the first two elements of a 
prima facie case of retaliation. (R. 933-934). The Appeals Board then 
turned to the third element, i.e., causation. In deciding that issue the 
Appeals Board imposed two requirements upon Carter that have not been 
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recognized under controlling case law. First, The Appeals Board effectively 
required Carter to prove Sullivan failed to take prompt and appropriate 
action in response to the underlying discrimination complaint. Although this 
element is required in discriminatory harassment cases (see, e.g., Hirase-Doi 
v. U.S. West Communications. 61 F.3d 777 (10th Cir. 1995), it has never 
been applied in retaliation claims. Neither the Appeals Board nor Sullivan 
has cited any authority or provided any analysis as to why this factor should 
be relevant to a retaliation claim. In fact, Sullivan never even raised this 
argument prior to the Appeals Board's decision. 
Employers are required by Federal and State law to take prompt and 
effective action in response to discrimination complaints. An employer's 
taking such action does not create any inference as to whether it 
subsequently retaliates against an employee for making the complaint. 
By construing Respondent's alleged prompt and appropriate response as 
evidence of non-retaliation, the Majority has conflated the elements of a 
retaliation claim and the elements of a discriminatory harassment claim. This 
approach is erroneous as a matter of law. 
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The Majority also effectively imposed a requirement that the 
underlying discrimination complaint involve contemporaneous events at the 
current employer. As stated above, the first element of a retaliation claim is 
engagement in protected opposition to discrimination. There is no dispute in 
this case that Carter's December 14,1997 constituted protected opposition to 
discrimination. In fact, the Appeals Board found that Carter satisfied this 
element. However, the Appeals Board proceeded to find that, because 
Carter's complaint involved events from several years before and at a 
different employer, that fact weighed against a finding of retaliation. In 
making this conclusion, the Majority either modified the first element of the 
retaliation claim, or created a new requirement—that the underlying 
opposition to discrimination involve contemporaneous events at the current 
employer. In either case, this additional requirement has not been 
recognized under Utah or Federal law. 
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IV. THE APPEALS BOARD FAILED TO CONSIDER THE 
FINDINGS OF THE ALJ AS TO CREDIBILITY. 
The ALJ's decision in this case was substantially based upon findings 
regarding the credibility of the witnesses. The following credibility 
determinations, at least, were crucial to his decision: 
1. The ALJ did not believe Scheutzow's testimony, given both at 
Trial and during his Deposition, that he was unaware of Carter's December 
14,1997 letter at any time prior to Carter's termination. In fact, 
Scheutzow's knowledge of Carter's letter was established by Simmons, a 
witness who was certainly not favorable to Carter, who testified that 
Scheutzow not only knew about Carter's letter, but that he also stated, 
"everybody better be careful." (R. 774-775). 
Scheutzow is a critical witness in this case. He at least initiated 
Carter's termination. Further, he knew that the stated grounds for Carter's 
termination—calling on the account of another sales representative—was 
false. The fact that the ALJ found Scheutzow was not a credible witness 
was crucial to his decision. 
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Second, the ALJ found that the testimony of Sullivan's witnesses 
regarding Engel's February 18,1998 letter to Carter was "almost surreal." 
(R. 781). In essence, Bingham testified that she complained about Carter's 
contacts with Dr. Clegg's office to Brown, who suggested that she contact 
Scheutzow. Bingham then contacted Scheutzow, who suggested she write a 
letter to Engel. Engel testified that Scheutzow requested he write the letter 
to Carter, and that he did not see any letter from Bingham. Scheutzow 
testified that he had no knowledge of Engel's letter to Carter until after it 
was sent. 
Sullivan has never attempted to explain the extensive conflicts in this 
testimony. Although the inconsistencies in themselves do not prove 
retaliation, they are probative when considered with other evidence, such as 
the admittedly harsh tone of Engel's letter, Engel's failure to discuss the 
issue with Carter or Human Resources prior to sending the letter, and the 
fact that no other sales representative received discipline for crossovers 
despite die numerous crossovers that occurred. Based upon these facts, the 
ALJ concluded, not just that Carter's termination was unwarranted, but that 
Sullivan Management "employed fallacious assertions against Ms. Carter... 
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as grounds for the termination of her employment" (R.785). TheALJ 
further found: "Sullivan-Schein had the ability to easily ascertain the truth 
concerning either the Clegg or Heritage accounts. Yet, Sullivan-Schein 
conspicuously avoided any opportunity for Ms. Carter to explain her 
conduct. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence in this case 
demonstrated that the Clegg and Heritage episodes amounted to gossamer 
pretexts for the termination of Ms. Carter." (R.786). 
The ALJ's decision in this case was clearly based upon his assessment 
of the credibility of the witnesses. However, the Majority of the Appeals 
Board did not mention any of these findings. In fact, the Majority's decision 
does not even contain the word "credibility." 
In Vali Convalescent and Care Inst. V. Div. Of Health Care 
Financing. 797 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1990), a DOH hearing officer 
determined that Vali had not intended to settle its claim for interest allegedly 
owed to it by DOH. Such determination was substantially based upon the 
hearing officer's assessment of the witnesses' credibility. However, the 
hearing officer's decision was reversed upon review by the Division's 
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Executive Director, who determined that Vali had settled its claim for 
interest. The decision of the Director was subsequently affirmed upon 
review by the District Court. 
Upon appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals first noted that the degree of 
deference accorded to the decision of an administrative agency varies based, 
in part, upon the expertise of the agency on the particular issue. The Court 
of Appeals found that the agency had comparatively little expertise 
regarding the key issues in the case. 797 P.2d at 442. The Court of Appeals 
then held that: "where, as here, the hearing officer's findings were 
apparently based to a large extent upon his credibility determinations, and 
the executive director took no live testimony, it is even more important for 
the executive director to adequately detail her reasons for reaching a 
different result." 797 P.2d at 447. The Court of Appeals remanded the case 
to the executive director for the purpose of making adequate findings. Id. 
The credibility determinations made by the ALT in the present case 
were at least as crucial to his decision as they were in Vali Convalescent. 
The failure of the Appeals Board to even consider the credibility issues in 
this case constitute reversible error. 
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V. THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE DOES NOT SUPPORT 
THE DECISION OF THE APPEALS BOARD. 
In determining whether the decision of the Appeals Board is 
supported by substantial evidence, the Court should first consider the degree 
of expertise that the agency possesses with respect to cases such as the 
present case. Vali Convalescent 797 P.2d at 442. The agency certainly has 
no greater expertise than the Court of Appeals in deciding discrimination 
cases. See, e.g., Viktron/Lika v. Labor Commission. 38 P.3d 993,995 (Utah 
App. 2001). Nor does the agency have any particular expertise in resolving 
conflicting evidence or discerning intent from circumstantial evidence. 
Therefore, this Court's deference to the decision of the Appeals Board 
should be limited. 
Further, as stated in Vali Convalescent 797 P.2d at 447, where a 
hearing officer's findings are based upon personal observation of the 
witnesses, they tend to negate the reasonableness of contrary findings and 
conclusions of the reviewing agency board. Moreover, the decision of the 
Appeals Board was split 2-1 in this case. 
The reliability of the Appeals Board's decision in this case is further 
undermined by the Majority's failure to consider or address the numerous 
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facts and circumstances that were set forth by the ALJ in support of his 
decision. The Majority simply rejected the extensive findings made by the 
ALJ without giving any reason. The Majority completely overlooked 
numerous facts (including credibility determinations) that tend to support the 
ALJ's conclusions, in favor of a few arguments or inferences that the 
Majority chose to make in favor of Sullivan. Moreover, the Majority never 
weighed or considered its arguments or inferences in light of the entire 
circumstances of the case. 
However, even affording full deference to the Appeals Board in this 
case, the arguments or inferences mat were cited by the Majority simply do 
not support its decision. The Majority cited the following reasons in support 
of its decision: 
(a). The Majority found that Sullivan took "prompt and appropriate 
action" in response to Carter's letter, thereby indicating that her letter was 
not a motivating factor for her termination. (R. 934). The Majority cited no 
authority and provided no rationale in support of this conclusion. In fact, 
there is no reasonable basis for an assumption that, just because Sullivan 
took prompt action in response to Carter's complaint, it did not subsequently 
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commit retaliation against Carter. Even if such a conclusion might be 
warranted in some cases, it should not apply where, as in the present case, 
the persons who took the "prompt action" were different than the persons 
who committed the retaliation (and notably failed to contact Human 
Resources in regard to their actions). 
(b). The Majority found that Carter's letter complaining of gender 
discrimination dealt with events several years past and at a different 
employer, thereby indicating that her letter was not a motivating factor for 
her termination. (R. 934). The Majority cited no authority and provided no 
reasoning in support of such conclusion. Again, there is no reasonable basis 
for an assumption that, just because Carter's letter dealt with past events, 
Sullivan did not engage in retaliation against Carter. Carter was a current 
Sullivan employee. The persons she complained about (Simmons and 
Brown) were current Sullivan employees, working in the same office as 
Carter. The complaint was made to Sullivan Management, and was 
disclosed to at least eight Sullivan Managers, in addition to Simmons and 
Brown. It was never disputed that the complaint constituted protected 
activity. The fact that Carter's complaint involved events from years past 
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is simply irrelevant to the issue of causation. 
(c). The Majority found that the sales representatives who 
complained about Carter did not know about Carter's letter. (R. 934). In 
fact, there was evidence that Bingham did know about the letter. (See Carter 
Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 129-131). More importantly, 
this finding simply misses the relevant point, which is whether Sullivan 
Management treated Carter adversely due to animosity arising from her 
letter. 
The ALJ found that the crossover complaints against Carter were 
factually without merit. (R. 785). However, that was not the basis for his 
decision. More importantly, the ALJ found that Carter's Managers avoided 
or disregarded any information that explained the crossover issues, in order 
to create a pretextual basis for Carter's termination. (R. 786). The ALJ 
further found that, in this respect, Carter's Managers treated her differently 
than the other sales representatives, all of whom had crossover issues, but 
did not receive discipline. 
The ALJ's determination mat the crossover complaints against Carter 
were unfounded was essential to his decision, but he did not confuse that 
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issue with the ultimate issue in the case, which is whether Carter's 
Manager's discriminated against Carter because of her complaint. The 
Appeals Board, on the other hand, completely failed to consider whether 
Carter's Manager's treated Carter adversely in relation to the crossovers 
because of her complaint. The Appeals Board simply states that Carter's 
coworkers did not know about her complaint, and leaves its analysis at that 
point. The Appeals Board fails to mention that Carter's Managers did know 
about Carter's complaint, and also knew that the crossover complaints 
against Carter were false (or deliberately avoided such knowledge). The 
Majority's decision does not consider this crucial point. 
(d). The Majority found that there was a complaint against Carter 
made by Butler regarding the account of Dr. Brooks. (R. 932,934). The 
Majority disregards the fact that Dr. Brooks' account was assigned to Carter, 
and that she never received any discipline for calling on his account. 
Sullivan has never asserted that Carter's calling on Dr. Brooks was a reason 
for her discipline or termination. 
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(e). With respect to Sullivan's failure to discuss the crossover 
complaints with Carter, or to involve Human Resources in her disciplinary 
action and termination, the Majority found: 
Sullivan-Schein's failure to investigate the details of the 
complaints against Ms. Carter is most reasonably attributable 
to 1) wide-ranging responsibilities of Sullivan-Schein 
managers; 2) disorganization and confusion engendered by the 
merger; 3) the company's paramount concern for the continuity 
of its newly combined sales force; and 4) the repetitive nature 
of the complaints about Ms. Carter's conduct." (R. 935). 
(emphasis added). 
The Appeals Board cited no evidence in support of these assertions, 
and there is no such evidence in the record. Further, it is inconsistent for the 
Appeals Board to assert that Sullivan took prompt and appropriate action in 
response to Carter's complaint, but was unable to even ask Carter about the 
validity of the complaints that were made against her. Indeed, when Carter 
tried to explain to Scheutzow that Heritage Dental was her account, 
Scheutzow refused to listen. The Majority disregarded the facts of the case 
and made excuses for Sullivan's conduct that are not supported by the 
record. 
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(f). The Majority made the following findings with respect to the 
procedure that Sullivan used in assigning accounts to sales representatives: 
To minimize the crossover problem, Sullivan-Schein began a 
process of identifying each sales representative's accounts. In 
cases where only one representative had been servicing an 
account, that representative retained the account. If more than 
one representative had been servicing an account, the account 
was assigned to the representative with the highest sales to the 
account. But if a customer expressed a preference for a 
particular sales representative, the account was assigned to that 
sales representative. In conjunction with this process of 
identifying accounts, two rules were emphasized by Sullivan-
Schein management and by the sales representatives 
themselves. First, no sales representative should have dealings 
with customers assigned to another sales representative. 
Second, no sales representative should solicit a customer to 
express a preference for that representative. This last rule was 
referred to as "soliciting loyalty." (R. 931-932). 
The Majority cited no evidentiary basis for this description of 
Sullivan's procedure, which is substantially inaccurate. For example, there 
is no evidentiary basis for the Majority's statement that, "no sales 
representatives should have dealings with customers assigned to 
another sales representative." The Majority also overlooks undisputed 
evidence regarding ambiguities and "grey areas" within Sullivan's procedure 
that were noted by the ALJ. (R. 777). 
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Most importantly, the Majority disregarded undisputed evidence that 
Sullivan's initial procedure in relation to account assignments was to 
have the sales representatives continue calling on the same accounts that 
they were calling on prior to the merger. (See preceding Paras, 15-
17). It was this procedure that led to the crossover problems, and this 
procedure remained substantially in effect up until the time of Carter's 
termination, as indicated by Butler's testimony that Sullivan held a meeting 
with the Salt Lake City sales representatives to address the crossover issues 
shortly after Carter was terminated. (See Statement of Facts, Para. 9). 
Aside from the legal errors in the Appeal Board's decision in this 
case, the evidence cited by the Appeals Board does not reasonably support 
its decision. Further, the Appeals Board did not address the extensive 
findings mat were made by the ALJ. Therefore, this Court should vacate the 
decision of the Appeals Board and adopt the decision of the ALJ. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing authorities, facts and arguments, Carter requests 
that the decision of the Appeals Board in this case be vacated, and that the 
decision of the ALJ be adopted. In the alternative, Carter requests that this 
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case be remanded to the Appeals Board for an amended decision based upon 
the applicable law and the evidence in the case. 
Respectfully submitted this day of January, 2006. 
Kenneth B. Grimes 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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